Section 4 says buyer hosts SHOULD sign their events "with a published
platform key," but the spec never says where the key is published.
In practice verifiers take the key from the log's own keys block,
which the host wrote. A malicious host can self-attest any key, so
buyer-side signatures currently prove authorship only against the
host's own claim.
There is no capability discovery. A client cannot learn which
protocol versions a host speaks before failing closed, which will
matter the day 0.2 exists.
Served with access-control-allow-origin: * and cacheable; the file is
public by design.
Verifiers SHOULD cross-check every buyer-side signer fingerprint in a
log against the host's published keys, fetched independently of the
log. A mismatch downgrades those signatures to unverified attribution.
Keys carry validity windows so rotation (RFC-007) does not invalidate
historical logs: a signature verifies against the key that was valid at
the event's at time.
protocol_versions lets a 0.2 client discover 0.1-only hosts before
sending anything, replacing a failed-closed error with a clean
capability answer.
Purely additive for hosts (a new endpoint), so it could ship as a 0.1.x
SHOULD; the verifier cross-check behavior belongs to 0.2. TLS remains
the root of trust for the fetch itself, which matches the protocol's
existing HTTPS assumption.